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SEMINOLE SPEAKS TO SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY AND EX PARTE YOUNG
WAYNE L. BAKER*
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.'
Justice Holmes' explication of sovereign immunity is
straightforward and succinct within the narrow province of lawmaker and subject. When a state is sued for a violation of a fed-

eral law, however, the state's sovereign immunity implicates
matters of paramount constitutional importance including supremacy, federalism, separation of powers, judicial activism and
restraint, and both Tenth2 and Eleventh Amendment considerations. To evade state sovereign immunity, a suit for prospective

relief for violations of federal law may proceed against a named
state official, under the "fiction" of Ex parte Young.4 The United
States Supreme Court recently addressed these issues in Semi-

nole Tribe of Floridav. Florida.'

* Law Clerk to the Honorable Joanna Seybert, Eastern District of New York;
LL.M. 1997, Yale Law School; J.D. 1996, St. John's University School of Law. The
author is grateful to the Executive Board, Editors, and Staff of the St. John's Law
Review for their invaluable and insightful input.
' Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (affirming decree of
foreclosure and sale, sovereign cannot be sued).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated
to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
3See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
4 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suits against individuals or state officers to
prevent enforcement of unconstitutional state statute do not violate federal constitution); see infra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
5 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (refusing to apply Ex parte Young and holding that
Congress lacked authority to abrogate state's sovereign immunity under Indian
Commerce Clause).
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INTRODUCTION

The following analysis will examine the Seminole decision by
focusing on the huge disparity between the majority and minority opinions in two specific areas: (1) Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and (2) the "fiction" of Ex parte Young.
Whether critiqued as juridicially sound, or as a drastic departure
from established precedent, Seminole strikes a blow for states'
rights and federalism.6 The Eleventh Amendment stands at the
vanguard of state autonomy. "The stakes involved in interpreting the Eleventh Amendment are very high. Virtually the entire
class of modern civil rights litigation plausibly might be barred
by an expansive reading of the immunity of the states from suit
in federal court."7 Clearly, Seminole's implications go far beyond
the reservations' boundaries.
I.

THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATION ACT, CONGRESS' GRANT OF
JURISDICTION?

In 1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulation Acte
(hereinafter "IGRA"). This law was passed in response to the
decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,'
6 See, e.g., Another Judicial Victory for Authority of the States, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1996, at B8 (noting controversy surrounding Seminole decision); Joan Biskupic,
High Court Bolsters State's Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (noting that
Supreme Court has attempted in recent years to correct encroachment of Congress
on states' rights); Commentator Claims Court'sDecision in Seminole Case Is Part of
States' Rights CampaignAimed at Liberalism, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 9, 1996, at
2978, available in 1996 WL 259681; Marcia Coyle, Court Decides Gambling Case in
States' Favor, NATL L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at A12 (" TIhe court is incredibly concerned
about federalism and about defining as clearly and properly as possible the relationship between the federal and state governments.'") (quoting constitutional scholar
Michael J. Gerhardt, of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary); Frank J. Murray, High Court Revives States' Rights Against Lawsuits,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (discussing "landmark victory for states' rights");
David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits Against the States, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at 1 (explaining that Supreme Court's endorsement of states'
rights and state sovereign immunity will have far-reaching effects on federalism);
Herman Schwartz, Supreme Court Opens New Round in Federal-State Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at M2, (explaining that Seminole is part of continuing
"campaign to expand states' rights" at expense of liberalism and welfare state).
P . Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 808 (2d ed. 1989).
8 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994)).
9 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (establishing distinction between prohibitory
laws and
regulatory laws - state law which prohibits conduct falls within state's criminal
jurisdiction, while states' general promotion of certain conduct is considered regula-
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which allowed Indian gaming in California.
In California,
gambling is regulated, not prohibited, and thus falls outside the
The
express statutory grant of state criminal jurisdiction."
Cabazon decision prompted a heated debate over the state's role
in regulating Indian gaming. 1 In response Congress enacted
IGRA to "provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct
of gaming on Indian lands ... [and] to promote tribal economic
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 2 IGRA granted Indian tribes the "exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is
not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted
within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and
public policy, prohibit such gaming activity."3 The regulatory
scheme requires the state to conduct "good faith" negotiations
with a tribe in order to arrive at a compact prescribing the conditions under which the gaming activities will be conducted.14 A
tribe that believes the state has failed to negotiate in good faith
may seek an order in federal district court 5 requiring the state
and the tribe to conclude the compact within a sixty-day period."6

tory law). This decision followed a line of cases that began with Seminole Tribe of
Floridav. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing Indian tribe to conduct bingo without interference from Florida State government).
'0See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (establishing "[sitate jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the Indian Country").
" Indian matters have always fallen exclusively under federal province, and it
is a long-established tradition that unless authorized by an act of Congress, the jurisdiction of state governments and the application of state laws do not extend to
Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994); but see Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (holding statecourt jurisdiction would not interfere with Indians' right to self-government).
,2 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3),(4).
'325 U.S.C. § 2701(5). An important part of IGRA, the "good faith" negotiations
requirement, was later declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida,holding that suits brought because of
a failure to engage in such negotiations would violate state sovereign immunity. See
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996).
14 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
11See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
16 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If an Indian tribe and the State fail to agree
on a compact, the "Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their last best offer for a
compact." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). Upon the mediator's determination, the
State may either consent to the compact within sixty days, or refuse to consent, in
which case the Secretary of the Interior will provide procedures, consistent with the
proposed compact selected by the mediator, to regulate the Indian tribe's class III
gambling. See id. § 2710 (d)(7)(B)(v)-(vii).
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II. THE SEMINOLE DECISION
The Seminole Tribe of Florida (hereinafter the "Tribe")
brought suit in federal district court against the State of Florida
and its governor, alleging that the State violated IGRA by failing
to conduct good faith negotiations regarding gaming activities to
be conducted on the Tribe's land. 17 The State moved to dismiss
the action pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution, asserting that Congress cannot lawfully enforce the "good faith" requirement by providing a judicial remedy
against the State.18 The Tribe maintained that Congress abrogated the States' immunity in enacting IGRA."9 The State
stipulated that the statutory language of IGRA 2° expressed a
17See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd,

11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1416
(1996).
18 See id. at 656; see also supra note 3.
'9 Three Eleventh Amendment exceptions exist. See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at
657. First, Congress may abrogate the State's immunity where it possesses the
power. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989), overruled by
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Second, a state may consent to suit in federal courts or waive its immunity impliedly. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). Third, state officers may, under certain
circumstances, be sued in their official capacities to obtain prospective relief. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Until Seminole, the Supreme Court recognized Congressional abrogation of
states' rights pursuant to its plenary interstate commerce power in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). Union Gas operated a coal gassification plant
which resulted in a deposit of coal along a river. During an excavation intended to
control flooding, Pennsylvania struck such deposit, which resulted in coal seeping
down the river. After the Environmental Protection Agency declared it a hazardous
waste site, the United States and the state government cleaned up the spill. Upon
reimbursing the state for its expenses, the United States government brought suit
against Union Gas Co. for reimbursement. Union Gas Co., in turn, sued the Commonwealth, arguing it was at least partly responsible for such costs. The district
court ruled that Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity barred the suit.
Though the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially agreed, it
changed its decision following a remand in light of an amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA'). As such, the Court of Appeals ruled that Pennsylvania could be held
monetarily responsible for damages in a lawsuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.
See id.
The Supreme Court held that Congress had the authority to override state sovereign immunity under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Congress
must make its intent to do so unmistakably clear. The express language in CERCLA
established the Congressional intent to hold states liable for monetary damages
rather than precluding all suits due to state immunity. See id. Union Gas, however,
was overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.See supra note 5.
20 The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over- (i) any
cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a
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clear intent to abrogate state immunity, but challenged whether
Congress could exercise this power consonant with the Indian
Commerce Clause. 2' The district court reviewed the historical
support for Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs,
and found that pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company2 2 Congress has the power to abrogate the States' immunity
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.'
The Seminole decision, and a parallel Alabama case, 4 were
consolidated on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.' The circuit court dismissed the cases,
holding that Congress did not possess the power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when enacting IGRA. As a result, federal courts were without authority to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over suits brought under IGRA.26 Chief Judge Tjoflat's methodical analysis eliminated state consent," CongresState to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct
such negotiations in good faith ....
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "'The Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with ... the Indian Tribes." Id.

4 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996). Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the States. See id. at 14.
See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 661 (explaining that since Supreme Court has
held Congress may abrogate State's immunity under Interstate Commerce Clause,
and both Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses are derived from same constitutional clause, same would apply to Indian Commerce Clause).
24 See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala.
1991) (holding Eleventh Amendment barred nonconsensual suit against Alabama
and that Congressional authority granted by Indian Commerce Clause was insufficient to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity). In a separate cause of
action recorded as Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549

(S.D. Ala. 1992), the court rejected an action for equitable relief against the governor and the state under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Ex parte Young doctrine for
alleged violations of IGRA.
Seminole, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
' See id. at 1019. An issue raised for the first time on appeal and therefore not
considered by this court or the Supreme Court was a Tenth Amendment challenge.
The defendants averred that IGRA coercively forces the states to negotiate with Indian tribes, and this coercive interference of a reserved state power violates the
Tenth Amendment as interpreted in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019; see also supra note 2.

27 Consent may arise in three circumstances: (1) express consent
through legislative enactment; (2) "plan of the convention" consent derived from the state's ratification of the Constitution; and (3) consent to suit as a prerequisite to participation
in a federal program. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1021-22.
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sional abrogation, 28 and application of the Ex parte Young doctrine 29 as impediments to the application of the Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity defense. The court concluded
that notwithstanding the sovereign immunity defense, the statute provides a remedy for the Tribe," which "conforms with
IGRA and serves to achieve Congress' goals....""
III. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST WRITES FOR THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 to determine two issues: first, whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress' authorization of suits by Indian tribes against States for
prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursu28 The

court applied a two-part inquiry to determine if Congress intended to ab-

rogate the States' immunity and whether Congress possessed the power under the
Constitution to do so. See id. at 1023-26. The court found that Congress expressed
the requisite intent but lacked the necessary power. See id. Determining that Congress enacted IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause, and not under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause as asserted by
the tribes, the court did not allow Congress to abrogate state immunity, and distinguished Union Gas as applicable when Congress legislates under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. See id. at 1025-27. The purposes underlying the Interstate
Commerce Clause, "to place limits on the state in order to 'maintain[ I free trade
among the States'" differs from that of the Indian Commerce Clause, " 'to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs'" sufficiently
to justify distinct treatment. Id. at 1027 (alteration in original) (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)).
2 The United States Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
held that a state official must have some connection with the alleged unconstitutional act in order to make the official a party to the suit. The Supreme Court reasoned that if the officer is not involved with the enforcement of the act, then to
a representative of the State,
make the officer a party would "merely mak[e] him ...
and thereby attempt[ ] to make the State a party." Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Furthermore, the Court held that where the discretion of an officer in the exercise of his
duties is concerned, courts may not dictate the exercise of such discretion. Rather,
the court may direct the state officer to perform ministerial duties. See id.; see also
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1686 (1997) (explaining that Ex parte Young establishes that state official does
not have Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits seeking prospective enforcement of federal law). The court in Seminole indicated that the Ex parte Young doctrine was inapplicable to compel an executive official to undertake a discretionary
task if the suit is, in reality, against the state. Consequently, the court concluded
that the facts in Seminole precluded an application of the Ex parte Young doctrine.
See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028-29.
30 "If the State does not consent during the 60-day period described in clause (vi)
to a proposed compact submitted by a mediator under clause (v), the mediator shall
notify the Secretary and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures .... 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (1994).
21

Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1029.

32 Seminole

Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1125 (1995).
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ant to the Indian Commerce Clause, an issue which had produced divergent circuit court decisions;3 and second, whether the
doctrine of Ex parte Young permits suits against a State's governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good faith bargaining requirement mandated by IGRA.
Chief Justice
Rehnquist penned a five to four majority opinion34 deciding the
first issue in the affirmative, the second issue in the negative,
and 35affirming the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's
suit.

Upholding States'EleventhAmendment Sovereign Immunity

A.

The Court's analysis of the first issue focused on whether
IGRA was passed pursuant to a valid exercise of Congressional
power, i.e., a constitutional provision granting Congress the
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The Court rejected
petitioner's reasoning that the prospective nature of the relief
sought," and/or the statutory grant in IGRA to the states of a
power that they would not otherwise have had," supports a
finding of the abrogation power. The Court reiterated the power
of Congress to abrogate pursuant to Section Five of the Four3In
accord with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Seminole, that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Indian tribes from bringing suit against the State, is Ysleta Del
Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994). Cases holding that the action was
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment include: Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d

1422 (10th Cir. 1994); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th
Cir. 1993); and Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).

:" Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Souter filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. See Seminole, 116
S. Ct. at 1119.
'

See id. at 1122.
See id. at 1124.

[Tihe type of relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to
abrogate States' immunity. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely
in order to "prevent[ ] federal court judgments that must be paid out of a
State's treasury[;]" it also serves to avoid "the indignity of subjecting a
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties."
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
37 Notwithstanding IGRA's grant of some measure of authority over gaming on
Indian lands to the state not otherwise provided in the Constitution, "[tihe Eleventh
Amendment immunity may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it
will be replaced by grant of some other authority." Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion turns on Congressional lack of power to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment, this particular statement by the Chief Justice goes
against his reasoning in past opinions. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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teenth Amendment,3 8 while reversing its previous acknowledgment of authority to abrogate originating in the Interstate Commerce Clause. 9 In so doing, the Court explicitly overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company. °

Relying upon a history of interpreting the Eleventh Amendment that reaches beyond its words, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited Hans v. Louisiana4 for the premise that underlying the
Eleventh Amendment is a presupposition that each State is a
sovereign entity in our federal system, and that "[i]t is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent."4 2

The decision in Hans was

founded upon the" jurisprudence in all civilized nations,'"43 not
just the English common law, and the Court there cautioned that
strict devotion to the text of the Eleventh Amendment would
"strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of."4
38

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall

have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Fitzpatrickstates:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state
authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is
"appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Id. at 456.
"' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... [tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .....
Id.
40491 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding power to regulate interstate commerce incomplete
without authority to render States liable in damages).
41 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that Constitution contained no right for Hans to
sue State of Louisiana to recover amount of State bonds he purchased and that
States had sovereign immunity from suits by its own citizens).
42 Id. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). The passage continues: "This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal." THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529
(1857)).
4Id.
at 15. The court expounded:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
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The Seminole majority explained the distinction between abrogation of States' sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and pursuant to Article I. The Court stated,
"the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and
federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh AmendFitzpatrick v. Bitzer46 cannot be read to justify
ment."4 5
"limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution."47 Article III circumscribes the outer limits of federal court
jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment restricts the exercise
of that judicial power. "Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction
.... [therefore] [e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits
by private parties against unconsenting States."48
To a legal novice it would strain credulity to imagine a constitutional amendment, subject to two centuries of interpretation, resulting in variegated viewpoints amongst Supreme Court
Justices. Unfortunately, this decision reinforces the Eleventh
Amendment's recondite reputation.4 9 One should not be mis-

Id.

the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that
nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its
own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The
supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.

Id Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454
(1996)). The theory that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a limitation upon the
Eleventh Amendment was explicitly rejected by the court in Ex parte Young, discussed infra, and effectively overrules decades of case law. See also infra notes 11522 and accompanying text.
46 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (finding that, through Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
could validly provide for legislative waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty protection for States to permit suits by private citizens in areas where it would normally be impermissible).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with plurality's reliance on Fitzpatrickfor support to limit protection of
Eleventh Amendment), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1416 (1996).
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32.
4 "The [Elleventh [Almendment is one of the Constitution's most baffling pro-
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guided by the unequivocal language of the amendment." Three
distinct interpretations have developed 51 from statutory enactments 12 and judicial decisions.53 Even the history of the amendment's ratification reveals disparate interpretations amongst the
Framers.54
1.

Limiting the Coverage of the Eleventh Amendment: Justice

visions .... " William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a
ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1983).
50 See supra note 3.
51 The three interpretations are: (1) as a restriction on federal court subject
matter jurisdiction; (2) as a reinstatement of common law immunity; and (3) as a
limit only on diversity suits against state governments. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 374-81 (2d ed. 1994). Another commentator has suggested
four possible interpretations of the text of the Eleventh Amendment:
(1) The Amendment barred diversity actions brought by a citizen of one
state against another state[;l (2) The Amendment (plus any penumbra)
barred both diversity actions and federal question actions by a citizen of
one state against another state, unless Congress made clear that the federal statute at issue was designed to abrogate state sovereign immunity[;]
(3) The Amendment (plus any penumbra) barred both diversity actions and
federal question actions by any citizen against any state, including the citizen's own state, unless Congress made clear that the federal statute at issue was designed to abrogate state sovereign immunity[; and] (4) The
Amendment (plus any penumbra) barred both diversity actions and federal
question actions by any citizen against any state, including the citizen's
own state, and the immunity may not be abrogated by a congressional act.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2239
(1996).
52 "Arising under" jurisdiction as currently codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1331 was not
enacted until 1875, seventy-seven years after the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, and therefore "it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the prospect of federal question jurisdiction over the States." Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130.
Contrary to this pronouncement, Justice Souter, in his dissent, asserts that "Article
III, of course, provided for such [federal question] jurisdiction, and early Congresses
exercised their authority pursuant to Article III to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts to resolve various matters of federal law." Id. at 1152 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
3 In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court interpreted the
breadth of the Eleventh Amendment to include federal question suits against a state
by its own citizens, finding that it would be "anomalous" to allow states to be sued
by their own citizens. Id. at 10.
5 In Welch v. Texas Departmentof Highways & Public Transportation,483 U.S.
468 (1987), the Court's historical analysis revealed that "[alt most, then, the historical materials show that-to the extent this question was debated-the intentions of
the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous." Id. at 483-84. Nor have judicial precedents illuminated the amendment. See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962). "[To reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior to
1949 would be a Procrustean task." Id. at 646.
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Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's reasoning on
numerous fronts. Questioning the Court's conclusions as illogical, Justice Stevens warned against the decision's far-reaching
implication of "prevent[ing] Congress from providing a federal
forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those
sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.""5 These concerns have been shared by commentators" and courts57 alike. According to Justice Stevens, the
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1131 n.16.
Justice Rehnquist criticizes Justice Stevens' conclusion as "exaggerated both in its
[and] misleadingly overbroad." Id. State comsubstance and in its significance ....
pliance with federal law is maintained through injunctive relief under Ex parte
Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law. Moreover,
"it has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright
statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded
relief against a State under any of those statutory schemes .... Id. "Although the
copyright and bankruptcy laws have existed practically since our nation's inception,
and the antitrust laws have been in force for over a century, there is no established
tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the States." Id. at 1132 n.16.
'6 See, e.g., Mark Browning, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look,
15 JuN Ai. BANKR. INsT. J. 10, 10 (1996) (suggesting that Seminole will impact actions involving state governmental agencies in bankruptcy, environmental, and
health care provider litigation, state tax determinations, and contract and tort
claims); Stephen W. Sather, et al., Borrowing From the Taxpayer: State and Local
Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 201, 230-31 (1996) (finding
Seminole applicable to Bankruptcy Code, and concluding that § 106 of Bankruptcy
Code "cannot be used to abrogate immunity guaranteed the States under the Eleventh Amendment"); see also Stephen L. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll, Private Enforcement After Seminole, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 26, 1996, at 2 (suggesting that "[ilt is environmental enforcement, however, that is most directly threatened by Seminole, for
no other body of regulatory law has relied so prominently, and successfully, on private parties to monitor and enforce state compliance with federal requirements").
7 The First and Tenth Circuits have affirmed dismissals of suits brought
against the states of Kansas and Maine, respectively, by former and present state
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA"). The courts
followed the reasoning of Seminole and held that because FLSA was passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause and because Congress does not have
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, there can be no cause
of action in federal court under FLSA against the states. See, e.g., Blow v. Kansas,
929 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Kan. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1997); Adams v.
Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 371 (D.Kan. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1997); Mills
v. Maine, Civ. No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3, 1996), affd, 118 F.3d
37 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996) (Supreme Court granted certiorari,vacated
judgment, and remanded copyright case against state-funded University of Houston
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Eleventh Amendment may raise concerns over Congressional
power to ensure enforceability in a federal forum, but it does not
stand as a jurisdictional bar to Congressional authority.58 Justice Stevens embraced Justice Brennan's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment as a restriction applying only to suits
premised on diversity jurisdiction.59 The majority's reliance upon
Hans was misguided in Justice Stevens' opinion, and Hans'
precedential value should be limited to its facts, a contractual
litigation between a citizen of a state and that state. Justice
Stevens' analysis supports constitutional supremacy, thus "in all
cases to which the judicial power does not extend-either because they are not within any category defined in Article III or
because they are within the category [explicitly] withdrawn from
Article III by the Eleventh Amendment-Congress lacks the
power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts,""0 otherwise,
the plenary powers of Congress are paramount. There is no rationale, therefore, for the majority's distinction between statutes
enacted pursuant to the power granted Congress in Article I or
those enacted to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
2. Historical Analysis of the Eleventh Amendment: Justice
Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter's scholarly and thorough 2 dissent, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, attempts to dispel the historical
myth of the Eleventh Amendment. The history of "the debate
addressed only the question whether ratification of the Constitution would, in diversity cases and without more, abrogate the
state sovereign immunity .... [Tihere was no textual support for

contending that Article III or any other provision would
'constitutionalize' state sovereign immunity .,63
Countering
to 5th Circuit for consideration of Seminole issues); College Savs. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 404 (D.N.J. 1996)
(involving state-funded institution raising Seminole as defense to patent infringement claims).
8 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59See id. at 1136 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
goId. at 1141 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6' See id. at 1142.
2Souter's
dissent is substantially longer in length and breadth, undertaking an
elaborate historical survey of the Eleventh Amendment.
6Id.
at 1147-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the revisionist conclusions surrounding the reaction to Chisholm
v. Georgia," Justice Souter suggests the decision was reasonable,
and the legislatures' reaction was not a "shock of surprise" leading to the immediate proposal and adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment.65
In analyzing the Amendment's text, Justice Souter proffers
two plausible readings," and he believes, as does Justice Stevens, in "reading the Eleventh Amendment solely as a limit on
citizen-state diversity jurisdiction ... [this position is buttressed
by] the views of John Marshall, 7 ... the history of the Amendment's drafting, and ... its allusive language,"" as well as the

writings of numerous contemporary scholars.69
Justice Souter's dissent dissected and rejected the holding of
Hans and what he termed the majority's "elevation[ I of judi'A2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793) (granting default judgment for plaintiff, South
Carolina citizen, against state of Georgia, for value of clothing supplied during
Revolutionary War, rekindled antifederalist fears and served as impetus for enacting the Eleventh Amendment).
"Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1148 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing history of
Court's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia and the adoption of Eleventh Amendment).
"The Eleventh Amendment acts to (1) "repeal[ I the Citizen-State Diversity
Clauses of Article I for all cases in which the State appears as a defendant"; and
(2) "strip[ ] the federal courts of jurisdiction in any case in which a state defendant
is sued by a citizen not its own, even ifjurisdiction might otherwise rest on the existence of a federal question in the suit." Id. at 1149 (Souter, J., dissenting).
6Id. at 1151-52. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), Chief
Justice Marshall stated that the Eleventh Amendment had no effect on the federal
courts' jurisdiction based on the "arising under" provision of Article HI and concluded that "a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is
cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." Id.
at 383. Marshall further explained that "[o]ne of the express objects, then, for which
the judicial department was established, is the decision of controversies between
States, and between a State and individuals." Id.
rSeminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1152 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that Eleventh
Amendment was drafted without specifically limiting federal question jurisdiction in
suits against states, although there was at least one proposal made prior to
Amendment's drafting which would have expressly provided this limitation). Justice
Souter therefore concluded that the Eleventh Amendment "simply does not apply"
to the plaintiffs in the case at bar because they are citizens of the State they are
suing. Id. at 1152.
6 See id. at 1150 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative
Grant of JurisdictionRather Than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L.
REV. 1033 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,

and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1988) (concluding that Eleventh
Amendment does not "supply" or "imply" a Constitutional immunity for States as to
claims arising under federal law).
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cially derived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional
law[s]."7 Although a cogent interpretation of the Hans holding
could expand the sovereign immunity protection to include suits
by a citizen of a State against that State and suits based upon
federal question jurisdiction, Justice Souter elucidated that the
anomaly addressed in Hans never existed.71 The consequence of
Hans, Justice Souter suggested, is "when a State injured an individual in violation of federal law no federal forum could provide direct relief."7 2 Citing historical analysis, Justice Souter advanced political motivations for the Hans decision including
sacrificing sovereign immunity jurisprudence to preserve the
power of the Contract Clause as well as preventing potential
noncompliance with the federal courts' judgments by hostile
state governments. 3
Challenging the conclusion that sovereign immunity is
"constitutional in stature and therefore unalterable,"7 4 Justice
Souter described the precedential language of Hans and its progeny, relied upon by the majority, as obiter dicta,75 and the prece-

70 Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained
that the majority's ruling had bolstered the century old incorrect reasoning of Hans.
See id.
71 "[Tlhe supposed anomaly of recognizing jurisdiction to entertain
a citizen's

federal question suit, but not one brought by a noncitizen" was fictitious as "federal
question cases are not touched by the Eleventh Amendment, which leaves a State
open to federal question suits by citizens and noncitizens alike." Id. at 1154 (Souter,
J., dissenting). This reasoning is of course consistent with Souter's limited textual
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.
1P Id. Souter explains that Hans took away the balance of judicial power under
Article III, along with the guarantees set forth in the Constitution, and damaged the
force of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to its power under Article I. See id.
73 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1155 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing John L. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2000 (1983)). Gibbons explained that Hans was decided
during extremely turbulent times. During the Compromise of 1877, the Union had
agreed to withdraw its troops from the South. However, this left the Federal Judiciary without much power. The Supreme Court was wary that the States would not
obey a ruling against them, which would expose the weakness of the Court. Gibbons
further stated that "[aifter the Act's passage, the Supreme Court, whenever it considered ordering relief to which local resistance might be anticipated, had to take
into account the President's readiness to enforce the decree." Gibbons, supra, at
1981.
7 Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1156.
7r See id. Souter explained that Hans is dicta, due to the fact that
there have
been cases in which the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Eleventh
Amendment by itself does not bar a suit with a federal question brought by a state
citizen. See id.
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dential language ignored as binding. 76 He also revealed corollary
inconsistencies inherent in the Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.77
To further discredit the majority's reliance on Hans, Justice
Souter weaved an intricate analysis of the origin, applicability,
and adoption of the common law in our young nation.7 8 The sovereign immunity relied upon in Hans, Justice Souter asserted,
originated in the English common law, 9 and the states adopted

"only so much of the common law as they thought applicable to
their local conditions.""0 On the national level, numerous factors
informed against complete textual incorporation of the common
law in the Constitution. 81 There were strong anti-English hostilities, 2 fears that "constitutionalizing" the common law would
render it immutable,' and moreover, the common law had devel-

' See id. at 1157-59. Souter explained that in many Court decisions sovereign
immunity has been referred to as a" background principle,' 'postulate,' or 'implicit
limitation,' and as resting on the 'inherent nature of sovereignty,' rather than any
explicit constitutional provision." Id. at 1158 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
77 If the Eleventh Amendment is a restriction on federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction, which cannot be waived, then that is inconsistent with a State's accepted authority to consent to suit. Additionally, if federal question suits are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over issues of
federal law arising in lawsuits brought against the States in state court would not
lie. See id. at 1158.
"' See id. at 1160-61 (explaining that although statutes affected the importance
of sovereign immunity, this doctrine was not included as part of the national codification and that most Americans understood sovereign immunity as deriving from
English common law, the reception of which was lukewarm at best). Souter finds it
unfathomable that sovereign immunity was inadvertently excluded from the Constitution. See id. at 1165.
7' See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1160.
Id. at 1162 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). It was generally understood that not all of English common law was to be adopted in America.
See id.
8' Interestingly, throughout the Constitution, "common law" only appears in
Article I and the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 1163. Additionally, the 1787 draft
contained no provision for adopting the common law at all, although States specifically made reference to the common law in their Constitutions. See id.
2See
id. at 1162 (Souter, J., dissenting). In a letter to John Breckenridge dated
January 15, 1802, James Monroe wrote, " '[The application of the principles of the
English common law to our constitution' should [sic] be considered 'good cause for
impeachment.'" Id. (quoted in 3 ALBERT J. BEvERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL: CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION 1800-1815, 59 (1919)).
"Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1164 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that due to fact
that there were different types of colonies, ruled by different governing principles,
and each evolving with different circumstances, there was no central common law
throughout the colonies, and thus no common law rule addressing state sovereign
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oped differently in each of the several states making "general
federal reception impossible."'
The Framers did not wish to
usurp state sovereignty by granting unduly broad jurisdiction to
the federal courts through adoption of a federal common law covering the entire field of legislation." Accordingly, Justice Souter
dismissed the notion of sovereign immunity as an enforceable
background principle."
To substantiate his posture that federal question cases are
outside the realm of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Souter
examined the Federalist Papers and the applicability of sovereign immunity in a dual-sovereign system.87 Quoting Chief Justice Marshall, as to "each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other,"" Justice Souter concluded, "[tihe
very idea of a federal question depended on the rejection of the
simple concept of sovereignty from which the immunity doctrine
had developed; under the English common law, the question of
immunity in a system of layered sovereignty simply could not
have arisen." 9
How Sovereign Immunity Is Defined Today

3.

If all that were at stake was an exercise in historical interimmunity) (citing R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 7 (1938)).
4Id.

See id. at 1165 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Madison in Debates on Alien
and Sedition Acts, Alien and Sedition Laws). Though this may support Souter's position that the Framers were against general federal reception of the common law, it
also strongly suggests that the Framers intended to retain sovereign immunity,
whether denominated as a common law doctrine or not.
86

See id.

87See id. at 1166-67 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained that the
majority construed Hamilton's statements in Federalist No. 81 incorrectly. See supra note 42. What Hamilton was referring to was a diversity suit under a federal
question. See id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) (discussing constitutionality of law passed by legislature of Maryland which imposed tax on Bank of
the United States). In finding the Maryland law unconstitutional, Marshall stated
that "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within
its sghere of action." Id. at 405.
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1172. Souter further asserted that the majority deprived its citizens of the opportunity to enforce federal rights in accordance with
Congressional intent. See id. at 1173. Souter rejected the view that since there is no
federal question statute, there is no jurisdiction in the federal courts. Souter inquired, "In the end, is it plausible to contend that the plan of the convention was
meant to leave the National Government without any way to render individuals capable of enforcing their federal rights against an intransigent state?' Id.
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pretation, the drastic polarization of the Justices' Eleventh
Amendment interpretation would not be so disconcerting. An
unadorned synopsis of their respective positions, however, reveals the dramatic gap that separates the two sides. The majority's analysis would exempt the States from all suits by a citizen
of that state or another state, absent the State's consent, except
where the underlying statute contains a clear legislative statement of Congressional intent to abrogate the States' immunity,
and Congress enacted the statute pursuant to the power granted
in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conversely, Justices Stevens' and Souter's dissenting opinions would only exempt the States from suits by citizens of another state when diversity of citizenship was the sole basis for subject matter
jurisdiction."0 In an era of expansive federal government, Seminole provides a strong measure of restraint in the name of "Our
Federalism."91 However, in light of the Justices' diametrically
opposed positions evident throughout this fractured opinion, all
that can be assured is that Seminole has preserved Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence as doctrinally open for rich scholarly
debate.
B.

Ex parte Young After Seminole

In light of the Court's expansion of the Eleventh Amendment, the primary mechanism to circumvent sovereign immunity-via injunctive relief against a state officer-assumes ut0 Of course, in either interpretation, the States would not be subject to "suit[s
by] ... Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State" as included in the Eleventh
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
91 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding that federal courts
cannot stay or enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings). Younger popularized the phrase "Our Federalism" in the jurisprudential vernacular. The Court defined it as
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
The confree to perform their separate functions in their separate ways ....
cept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What
the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
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most importance. It is therefore necessary to examine the rule
in Ex parte Young92 and the Seminole spin.
A successful suit brought against a state official under Ex
parte Young would enjoin the implementation of official state
policy, thus creating what has been termed the "fiction" of Ex
parte Young.
W[hen you] sue the government ... you must falsely pretend ...
that the suit is not against the government but that it is against
an officer. You may get relief against the sovereign if, but only
if, you falsely pretend that you are not asking for relief against
the sovereign. The judges often will falsely pretend that they
are not giving you relief against the sovereign, even though you
know and they know, and they know that you know, the relief is
against the sovereign. 93
Fiction or not, the jurisprudential magnitude of Ex parte
Young cannot be overstated. 94 Professor Charles Wright has
deemed it "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional
government and the rule of law,"9 5 and "one of the three most
important decisions the Supreme Court of the United States has
ever handed down."96 It offers an "effective mechanism for providing relief against unconstitutional conduct by state officers
and for testing, in the federal courts, the constitutionality of the
state statutes under which they act."97 One noted commentator
92 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
93 Kenneth Culp Davis,

Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an
Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 435 (1962).
. Although considered the seminal decision, the Court previously considered
these issues in cases leading up to Ex parte Young. In Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall determined that federal courts have jurisdiction as long as the State is not a named party on the record,
however, relief might be denied if the official was only a nominal party. Accord In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (holding that acts not constituting individual wrongs
done by state officers, if something that only State, through its officers, could do, in
substance provided basis for suit against State and therefore prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment).
" CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312 (5th ed. 1994). Wright

concedes, however, that Ex parte Young was, in fact, a fiction and seemed to be in
conflict with earlier law. "It is only doubtfully in accord with the prior decisions. It
was greeted with harsh criticism by the country when it was decided and for years
thereafter." Id. at 311.
'6

WRIGHT, ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 4231,

at 559-60 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that Ex parte Young established power of federal
courts to "enforce the Constitution against state legislative and executive action").
[Editor's Note: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) are the other two cases.]
97See WRIGHT, supra note 96 at § 3524, at 154. The fiction of Ex parte Young
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concluded that "without Young, federal courts often would be
powerless to prevent state violations of the Constitution and federal laws.""8
1.

A Review of Ex parte Young

In Ex parte Young,9 9 the state of Minnesota passed multiple
Acts substantially reducing the rates for railroad freight and
passenger travel within the State, while providing severe penalties for violations.'
The railroad companies' stockholders commenced suit in equity in federal court on the day before the Acts
were to take effect, naming the State Railroad Commission and
Edward T. Young, the attorney general of Minnesota, among
others, as defendants.'
The suit alleged that the rate orders
were deprivations of property without due process of law and
equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Constitution and
The circuit court of the United
the amendments thereof.'
States for the district of Minnesota issued a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction, preventing the
railway company from publishing and reducing rates and restraining the attorney
general from enforcing the Acts' remedies
0 3
and penalties.

Young, in a motion to dismiss the court order, averred that
the court had no jurisdiction over him as attorney general because the State of Minnesota did not consent to suit, and therefore the suit, which in actuality was a suit against the state, was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment."' The motion was denied. 5
Young filed a petition for, and was granted, a writ of mandamus
in state court commanding the railway company to immediately
has been applied to a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., Gay Students Servs. v.
Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 620 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980) (involving state instrumentalities).
' CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 393.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'" See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 127, 148. According to the Act, any common
carrier who violated the Act was guilty of a misdemeanor and would receive a fine of
at least $2500 for the first offense and no less than $10,000 for a second offense. See
id. People who could be punished under the Act included all railroad companies,
their officers, agents, and representatives. See id. at 128.
1o See id. at 129. All of the defendants in the action, except the railway company, were citizens of the State of Minnesota. See id.
02 See id. at 130-31, 144-45.
103

See id. at 132, 148-49.

See id. at 132.
105See id.
004

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:739

publish and adopt the rates as scheduled in the Acts. 0 6 In response, the circuit court issued an order to show cause to Young
for violating the injunction, and thereafter held him in contempt. 1 7 Young filed
a writ of habeas corpus and certiorari to
18
the Supreme Court.'

The United States Supreme Court ruled against Young and
held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
state officers to enjoin violations of federal law."' The Court decided that the provisions of the Acts "relating to the enforcement
of the rates, either for freight or passengers, by imposing such
enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are
unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question of
the insufficiency of those rates.""'
The Court proceeded to discuss whether an injunction may
lie, and after reviewing previous precedents stated that
"individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some
duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and
who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a
civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an
unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be
enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." "' The
named officer must have a duty to enforce the unconstitutional
state law because "it is plain that such officer must have some
connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely
making him a party as a representative of the state, and thereby
attempting to make the state a party.""' The Court stressed
that the named officer's connection with enforcement of the act,
"is the important and material fact, and whether it arises out of
the general law, or is specially created by the act itself, is not
material so long as it exists.""
As to whether the suit, alleging Fourteenth Amendment
violations is, in effect, one against the state of Minnesota, not the
Attorney General, and therefore in violation of the Eleventh
'06
107

See id. at 133-34.

See id. at 134.

10 See id. at 126.
'1'

See id. at 155-56.

110Id. at 148.
"' Id. at 155-56.
...
Id. at 157.
11 Id.
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Amendment, Justice Peckham declared, in what has become an
often quoted pronouncement:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it
be so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without

the authority of, and one which does not affect, the state in its
sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act
upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the state, to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment,
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct. The state has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority
of the United States.114
Interestingly, in the Court's analysis, the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments interplay in equipoise." 5 Ironically,
Seminole's majority opinion takes the opposite stance, stating
that "through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment
and therefore that [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed
by that Amendment." 6 This analysis in Ex parte Young presents a conundrum, for the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
showing of state action, yet the attorney general's action was
deemed the illegal act of a state official, not affecting the state in
its sovereign or governmental capacity."7 Thus, if the officer
acted on behalf of the state, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit,
Id. at 159-60.
See id. at 149. In addressing the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court declared:
[A] decision of this case does not require an examination or decision of the
question whether its adoption in any way altered or limited the effect of
the earlier Amendment. We may assume that each exists in full force, and
that we must give to the Eleventh Amendment all the effect it naturally
would have, without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more
narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant.
Id. at 150.
116 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125, cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1416 (1996); accordsupra text accompanying note 38.
117 See supra text accompanying note 114.
114
'
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if the officer acted illegally, there is no state action and no constitutional violation." 8 In addition, by allowing each amendment
to stand alone, "state action" lost its signification, and is rendered polysemous.
Young's conundrum may have presented just another chapter of fiction, as the Court grappled with and resolved this issue.
In Barney v. City of New York," 9 four years before Ex parte
Young, the Court decided that an action beyond the authority of
the state officer, unauthorized by state law, did not satisfy state
action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 2 ' However, the
Court in Home Telephone & Telegraph v. City of Los Angeles, 2'
five years after Ex parte Young, determined that a state actor's
action is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
notwithstanding the actor's violative conduct is outside the purview of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 22 This has remained
the rule to date.
The Court in Young highlighted that the power to enjoin a
state official does not include the power to enjoin courts from
proceeding in a case properly before it." The petitioner also
challenged the order because the statute empowered the attorney general in his discretion to attempt its enforcement or not,
and therefore "the court cannot interfere to control him as attorney general in the exercise of his discretion." 24 The Court acknowledged that it could not control the exercise of the discretion
of an officer, but because the injunction at issue restrained the
officer from enforcing an unconstitutional legislative enactment,
no affirmative action of any nature was directed. 2- "An injunction to prevent him from doing that which he has no legal right
" 6
to do is not an interference with the discretion of an officer. 12
Addressing the fear of a flood of similar litigation, the Court imposed the restriction "that no injunction ought to be granted un-

118 See CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 51, at 393.
193 U.S. 430 (1904) (dismissing suit against city where Board acted outside
scope of its authority in constricting railroad in proximity to plaintiffs residence).
20

See id.

121 227

U.S. 278 (1913) (reinstating complaint against state board that lowered
telegraph rates, regardless of whether board's act was authorized).
12 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 393.
'2 209 U.S. at 163.
121Id. at 158.
12 See
126Id.

id. at 159.
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less in a case reasonably free from doubt."127
Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter, quickly spotted the apparent fiction, pronouncing:
was, as to the defendant Young, one against him as,
the suit ...
and only because he was, attorney general of Minnesota. No relief was sought against him individually, but only in his capacobject of seeking such relief
ity as attorney general. And the ...
test the
was to tie the hands of the state so that it could not ...
validity of the statutes and orders in question. It would therefore seem clear that within the true meaning of the 11th
Amendment the suit brought in the Federal court was one, in
legal effect, against the state,-as much so as if the state had
been formally named on the record as a party,-and therefore it
was a suit to which, under the Amendment, so far as the state
or its attorney general was concerned, the judicial power of the
United States did not and could not extend.u2
The years to follow provided the courts with numerous opportunities to refine and define the circumstances in which a suit
against a state official will go forward. 9 Generally, the decisions have reaffirmed the application ofEx parte Young."'
IV. SEMINOLE REJECTS APPLICATION OF EXPARTE YOUNG
In Seminole, Chief Justice Rehnquist, swift and terse, ruled
out application of the doctrine of Ex parte Young to the Tribe's
suit against Governor Chiles. The alleged violation of federal
law was the Governor's failure to bring the State into compliance
with IGRA, specifically, to negotiate in good faith with an Indian
tribe toward the formation of a compact.' 31 However, the Court
held that Congress provided a "carefully crafted and intricate
remedial scheme""32 in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), and "where ConId. at 166.

117

Id. at 173-74 (emphasis in original).
'29
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
18

(granting relief against state officials on basis of state law, whether prospective or
retrospective did not fall within Ex parte Young); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive relief even though state
official is named defendant). See generally 13 WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 3524 (2d ed. 1984).
1 0 See WRIGHT, supranote 129.
131 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).
132 Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. The intricate remedial scheme required: (1) a
court finding the State failed to negotiate in good faith; (2) at which time the Court
may only issue an order requiring the parties to conclude a compact within 60 days;
(3) failure to do so only requires each side to submit a proposed compact to a media-
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gress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court
should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young." 3 ' The Court failed to explain how the remedial scheme
would proceed absent court involvement, when in fact a federal
court must find that a state failed to negotiate in good faith to
initiate IGRA's regulatory scheme.13 Allowing a suit directly
against the Governor, the Court reasoned, would effectively render the statutory scheme superfluous. 3 5 Furthermore, the statu-

tory language of IGRA does not manifest a clear
Congressional
3
intent to authorize suit against a state official.

,

Addressing the apparent incongruity of Congress intending
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, yet without constitutional
authority to do so, and Congress not intending to allow suit
against a state officer, but having the authority to do so, the
Court tartly concluded, "[nior are we free to rewrite the statutory
scheme in order to approximate what we think Congress might
have wanted had it known that [25 U.S.C.] § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority."'37 The Chief Justice specifically repudiated
Justice Souter's allegation, 38 noting, "we do not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young
tor who will choose accordingly; and (4) if the State does not accept the mediator's
decision, the Secretary of Interior will prescribe regulations. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(7)(A), (B).
'3 Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. Rehnquist's analysis is consistent with his prior
"bitter sweet" jurisprudence. In Arnett u. Kennedy, Rehnquist asserted that the procedural right was tied to the substantive right, and therefore the courts should not
read a procedural guarantee mandated by the Constitution into the explicit statutory language where some procedural safeguards were included. See Arnett, 416
U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974).
134 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
'3"See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. The Court reasoned that given a choice between the intricate scheme of relief under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) and the full remedial powers of the federal courts under Ex parte Young, the obvious and natural
choice would be to opt for the latter "more complete and more immediate relief." Id.
1"6 See id. at 1133 n.17. The Court held that unlike particular
statutes, which
lower courts have found Congress implicitly authorized under Ex parte Young, the
text of IGRA, taken as a whole, "repeatedly refers exclusively to 'the State.' "Id.
137 Id. at 1133.
"8 Justice Souter responded that the statutory limitations apply whether the
suit was brought against the State or a state officer, since "Congress has just as
much authority to regulate suits when jurisdiction depends on Young as it has to
regulate when Young is out of the jurisdictional picture." Id. at 1183; see infra note
157 and accompanying text.
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over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme." 139
Justice Souter Responds in Dissent
Justice Souter in dissent first suggests the rule of Ex parte
Young, being historically rooted in our jurisprudence, "should not
be easily displaced, if... at all, for it marks the frontier of the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing state
policies." 4 ' For Justice Souter, the applicability of Young should
be the baseline default position, rather than the majority's requirement of a clear showing of Congressional intent to allow
suit to proceed against a state officer.' Thus, "if Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention
42
to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. ,
Comparing Seminole to Young and its progeny, Justice Souter
finds no meritorious distinction, for the relief requested is not
retrospective,14 and although Young involved a negative injunction-precluding official action-affirmative injunctions ordering
an official to act have also been countenanced by this Court.'
Justice Souter addressed in seriatim the majority's three
reasons why the intricate procedures of IGRA displace the rule of
Ex parte Young: [1] "[tlhe procedures ...
implicate a rule against

A.

judicial creativity in devising supplementary procedures; ...[2]
applying Young would nullify the statutory procedures; ...[and]
[3] the statutory provisions ...reveal a congressional intent to

preclude the application of Young." 45 In support of the first rea' ' Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 n.17. Thus, the majority simply holds that although Congress could have authorized federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young,
such was not the case here with IGRA. See id.
'
Id. at 1180.
1
See id. (noting that Ex parte Young and its doctrine "playB a foundational
role in American constitutionalism").
142 Id.
at 1181 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242

(1985)).
'4See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (establishing that Young doctrine
may not be used to allow suits for retrospective monetary awards). Justice Souter
noted this limitation on the scope of the doctrine as being the only one recognized by
the Court since Young was first decided. See Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1178. However,
since the case involves prospective relief, this limitation is irrelevant. See id. at
1181.
1 See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (requiring state officials to
notify welfare beneficiaries of availability of past benefits); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977) (order requiring Michigan officials to pay money from state treasury
to fund education plan).

,""Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1181.
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son Justice Rehnquist cites Schweiker v. Chilicky;11 however
Justice Souter readily distinguishes Chilicky as seeking a supplemental remedy, requiring an affirmative justification based
upon a Bivens " model." Young provides prospective enforcement of federal law, not retrospective monetary relief. Specifically, "Young would not function here to provide a merely supplementary regime of compensation to deter illegal action, but
the sole jurisdictional basis for an Article III court's enforcement
of a clear federal statutory obligation, without which a congressional act would be rendered a nullity in a federal court."""
Conversely, Bivens detailed two situations in which causes
of action for constitutional violations would not exist: (1) where
there are "special factors counseling [sic] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"5 ' and (2) if Congress
specified an alternative mechanism providing an equally effective substitute. 5 ' The language of Bivens contains its own exceptions,1"2 one of which accommodated Chilicky,53 however, no
'4 487 U.S. 412 (1988). Claimants whose social security disability benefits were
terminated during disability reviews, but were later restored, brought action for
money damages against the state official who administered social security disability
benefits programs, alleging the terminations violated claimants' Fifth Amendment
rights. The Supreme Court held that improper denial of disability benefits, allegedly
resulting from due process violations in administration of continuing disability review programs, did not give rise to claims for money damages against government
officials who administered program. The specific language relied upon was "[wihen
the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies." Id. at 423.
147 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court held that the petitioner whose Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when he was subjected to illegal search and seizure by Federal Agents was "entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he
has suffered as a result of the agents' violation." Id. at 397. Recognizing that the
Fourth Amendment did not explicitly provide for money damages as a remedy for
the consequences of its violation, the Court nevertheless held that " 'where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue
for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.' "Id. at 396 (quoting Bell. v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1181.
149 Id. at 1182.
'50Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
'1 See id. at 397 (finding no Congressional mandate that injury from Fourth
Amendment violation be remitted to another remedy).
112 Id.
at 396-97.
'-' Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 412-13. The Court held that the first limitation of
Bivens applied, determining that such "special factors" include statutory mechanisms which provide relief. Id.
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analogy to Ex parte Young is apposite.
Secondly, the Court proffered that utilization of Young
would allow litigants to ignore the "intricate procedures" of
IGRA. Young, Justice Souter counters, does not establish a new
cause of action, rather it provides a jurisdictional basis to proceed against the state officer."M The procedural intricacies of
IGRA still have to be complied with, Young simply establishes
the jurisdiction needed to challenge enforcement of those procedures. Souter offered in analogy the statutory restrictions of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) circumscribing habeas corpus petitions, in
which case the restrictions apply, notwithstanding that Young
effectively provides the jurisdictional basis. 5' Thirdly, the Court
suggests that Congress intended that IGRA displace Young.'56
Justice Souter propounds the opposite conclusion."57 Finally,
Justice Souter refers to the time honored traditions of "read[ing]
ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional infirmity," and
"choos[ing] any reasonable construction of a statute [rather than]
Implementation
...confront a contested constitutional issue."'
applicarequire
Young's
he
asserts,
would
of either
doctrine,
159
tion.
CONCLUSION
Surprisingly, the Court did not discuss the discretionary
analysis that was critical to the Eleventh Circuit's decision and
extensively relied upon in respondent's briefs to the Supreme
Court. 6 ' Souter brings to light the all important fact that the
See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1182 ("It stands, instead, for a jurisdictional rule
by which paramount federal law may be enforced in a federal court by substituting a
nonimmune party (the state officer) for an immune one (the State itself).").
15 See id. at 1182-83. Interestingly, the majority in Ex parte Young also analogized to the habeas corpus statute wherein a state prisoner can be discharged from
custody via service of the writ on the state officer illustrating federal supremacy. Ex
parteYoung, 209 U.S. 198 (1908).
114See Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1183.
157 Citing IGRA's jurisdictional provision: "[tihe United States district courts
arising from the failure of a
any cause of action ...
shall have jurisdiction over ...
or to conduct such negotiations in good faith." 25
State to enter into negotiations ...
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). The State is clearly not the only possible defendant
authorized by this statute. See Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1183.
" Id. at 1184; see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trade Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S.
490, 500-01 (1979).
...
Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1184.
"oSee Brief for the Respondent, Seminole, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (No. 94-12),
available in 1995 WL 271443.
14
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doctrine of Ex parte Young provides the court jurisdiction and
does not alter or foreclose IGRA's statutory remedies. The majority's Young analysis appears result driven. Allowing the Tribe
to proceed against the Governor of Florida would have taken the
bite out of the Court's Eleventh Amendment interpretation. Yet
unlike the Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis, the opinion
does little to change the applicability of Ex parte Young, and
Congress can easily empower future legislation by creating a
private right of action against state officials, notwithstanding a
limited remedial scheme. Congress may be hindered in enforcing legislation directly against the states, however it is expected
that individual rights will be preserved as the fiction of Ex parte
Young will remain the blueprint to enjoin state officers acting in
violation of the law.

